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Abstract 
This study looks at how short sales constraints affect the stock price adjustment to the release 
of public information in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange for a sample of 4,757 firm-event 
observations over the period 1994-2011. Using a unique feature of this market that allows us 
to directly investigate the impact of the imposition of short sales restriction, we find 
following results. First, nonshortable stocks react more strongly to negative information than 
shortable stocks. Second, nonshortable stocks are overpriced before the negative earnings 
announcement. Hence, part of the strong market reaction of nonshortable stocks on 
announcement day could be due to the correction of such overpricing. Third, prices of 
nonshortable stocks reverse following the announcement of negative information, suggesting 
that investors overreact to the negative information on the announcement day. Fourth, it takes 
longer time for the prices of nonshortable stocks to fully adjust to the negative earnings 
information. On the whole, our results are supportive of the stream of research that finds the 
imposition of short sales restrictions reduce the efficiency of stock markets. 
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1. Introduction 
Generally, during financial market crisis many regulators around the world attempt to 
constrain short selling activities. Regulators, due to market pressure looking for an escape 
route or their genuine belief, argue that short sales destabilize the markets and lead prices to 
deviate far away from their fundamental values. Regulators contend that through banning 
short selling activities, they could prevent sudden and significant drops in stock markets.   
Beber and Pagano (2013) report that among the 30 markets in their sample, 21 imposed short-
selling ban during the 2008-2009 crisis, either on the whole stock markets or some specific 
sectors.  
However, the extant research questions the effectiveness of such drastic practices. 
Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) explore the impact of short sales constraints on the speed of 
price adjustment to private information. They show that when short sales are constrained, 
individual stock prices adjust slowly to common factor information, particularly to negative 
information. And when private information becomes public, price adjustments are larger in 
magnitude. Abreu and Brunnermeier (2002, 2003), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) show that 
short sales constraints can lead to formation of bubbles and excessive volatility in markets. 
Hong and Stein (2003), using heterogeneous agent model, further show that if investors are 
constrained from short selling, their accumulated unrevealed negative information will 
aggravate a market decline, leading  to a crash. These findings show that instead of 
stabilizing the markets as regulators hope for, short sales constraints could actually 
destabilize the markets and have an adverse effect on efficiency of stock prices.  
 Bernardo and Welch (2004), in contrast, develop a theoretical model showing that it is 
the fear of financial crisis, instead of a real liquidity shock, that causes a financial crisis. One 
implication of their model is that some market constraints, such as imposing short sales 
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constraints, can hinder some market participants from front-running other investors and thus 
can effectively prevent financial crisis. Their conjecture is consistent with Allen and Gale 
(1991) who show that short selling can destabilize the economy.  
 Besides the theoretical debate on the effect of short sales constraints on markets, there 
are also many empirical studies. Jones and Lamont (2002), and Chang, Cheng and Yu (2007), 
using U.S data and Hong Kong data, respectively, find that stocks that are expensive to short, 
or with short sales constraints, are overpriced. They also document higher volatility when 
short sales are allowed. These findings are consistent with Miller (1977)’s prediction, 
suggesting a market stabilizing function for short-sales constraints. Asquith and Meulbroek 
(1995), Aitken et al. (1998) and Danielsen and Sorescu (2001), all find that the introduction 
of short sales is associated with negative future returns, indicating that negative information 
is incorporated into prices more slowly when short sales constrains are in place. Similar 
findings are found in studies by Fung and Draper (1999), Bris, et al. (2007), Boehmer, Jones 
and Zhang (2008), Boehmer and Wu (2007), and Chen and Rhee (2010).    
Our study adds to the literature by empirically looking at how stocks with/without 
short sales constraints react to the public information. The current study is mainly motivated 
by Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) who develop a rational expectations model where 
investors take into account the short sales constraints when making their investment decisions. 
According to their model, as investors with private negative information are prevented from 
short selling, it takes longer time for information to be incorporated into prices, especially 
negative information. Hence, when the information is made public, stocks with short-sales 
constraints will react more strongly to the information than stocks without such constraints. 
Hence their model has two empirically testable predictions: (1) Stocks with short-sales 
constraints react more strongly to public information than stocks without such constraints; (2) 
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Stocks with short-sales constraints react to public information more slowly than stocks 
without such constraints, particularly to negative information.  
There has been some research that empirically tests this model, using the introduction 
of exchange traded options as a proxy for the possibility of short selling (Jennings and Starks, 
1986; Skinner, 1990), or the loan prices in the lending market to proxy for the cost of short 
selling (Reed, 2007). The advantage of our study is the use of a direct measure of short sales 
constraints—our sample stocks are deliberately separated into two groups: one group of 
stocks can be freely sold short, while the other is strictly forbidden to be sold short, though 
they are traded in the same stock market, namely Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE, 
henceforth). This market provides an ideal setting to conduct our research where only stocks 
that meet certain requirements are allowed to be sold short. The list of designated stocks that 
can be sold short is revised on a quarterly basis, and stocks that become newly eligible are 
added to the list while stocks that become no longer eligible are removed from the list. The 
presence of such a practice enables us to compare the reaction of stocks with/without short-
sales constraints to the same type of information. In particular, we use the event study 
methodology to examine if stocks that are allowed to be sold short react differently than 
stocks that are not allowed to be sold short to earnings announcements. Moreover, changes in 
short-sales constraints for stocks take place at different times, which helps to reduce the 
possibility that our cross-sectional analysis will suffer from potential contemporaneous 
changes in other market-wide factors (Bessembinder, 2000, Chang, Cheng and Yu, 2007). 
The public information proxy we use is the earnings announcements.  
Consistent with Diamond and Verrecchia (1987)’s predictions, we find that on the 
announcement day prices change more significantly for stocks with short-sales constraints 
than stocks without constraints, for both positive and negative information. On average, 
abnormal returns of shortable stocks amounts to -5.57% on the announcement of negative 
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information, while those of non-shortable stocks is -8.10%. On the announcement of positive 
earnings news, shortable and non-shortable stocks have average abnormal returns of 7.83% 
and 12.60%, respectively. 
In order to gain more insight into the reaction of shortable versus nonshortable stocks, 
we further look at the price behaviour of stocks around the earnings announcements, i.e., 10 
days before and 60 days after the announcements. We find that during the 10 days before the 
announcement of the negative earnings news, prices of nonshortable stocks increase 
substantially more than those of shortable stocks (2.32% vs. 0.79%). Such phenomenon is 
consistent with Miller’s overpricing theory (Miller, 1977). Before the information is publicly 
available, there is heterogeneous expectation on the information. But due to the short sales 
constraints, while optimistic investors are able to incorporate their future expectation of firm 
performance into prices by simply buying the stocks, many pessimistic investors cannot sell 
the stocks because they do not own them. Hence, stocks with short sales constraints are 
overpriced until the information is made public and part of their greater price reaction of 
nonshortable stocks on the announcement day is the correction of the overpricing formed 
previously. For the good earnings information, over the 10 days before announcements, the 
abnormal returns for shortable and non-shortable stocks are -0.96% and 0.51%, respectively. 
Although the non-shortable stocks exhibit overvaluation relative to shortable stocks again, the 
magnitude is much smaller compared with the scenario when bad earnings announced.  
We further investigate the pricing of the stocks following the announcements to see 
how efficiently the prices react to public information, applying Savor’s regression framework 
(Savor, 2012).  Our results indicate that while prices of shortable stocks react efficiently to 
the negative information on the announcement day, prices of nonshortable stocks seem to 
overreact to the information, with prices reversing following the announcements. Therefore, 
part of the greater price reaction of nonshortable stocks on the announcement day is caused 
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by investors’ overreaction. Further test shows that it takes, on average, 9 days for the 
nonshortable stocks to fully correct the mispricing. However, when we look at good earnings 
announcements, both shortable and non-shortable stocks react to the information efficiently. 
The result confirms Diamond and Verrecchia (1987)’s prediction that short-sales constraints 
delay stocks’ price adjustment to negative information. 
Our study contributes to the debate on impact of short-sales constraints on price 
efficiency by explicitly examining the price behaviour around earnings announcements of 
both stocks with short-sales constraints and stocks without constraints. Besides providing 
empirical evidence to support the theoretical prediction that short-sales constraints enlarge 
stocks’ reaction to negative public information and prolong their price adjustments, our 
findings suggest that the big price drops of nonshortable stocks on the announcement of 
negative news come from three sources: 1) convergence to new fundamentals, 2) correction 
of previous overpricing, and 3) overreaction to new information. Such insight adds to the 
literature on short sales constraints and market efficiency with important implications for 
regulators and market participants.  
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the background of the 
Hong Kong stock market and the selection of our sample. Section 3 describes our data and 
methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Short Sales in HKSE and Sample Selection 
Short sales were prohibited on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKSE) until January 
1994 when a pilot scheme was introduced under which 17 stocks became eligible for short 
selling. From January 1994, the HKSE also adopted the “uptick rule”, which mandated that a 
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short sale could not be made below the best current ask price. The rule was repealed in March 
1996, but reinstated on September 7 1998 following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The 
designated list of stocks that can be sold short is revised on a quarterly basis since 1996. By 
December 2011, the end of our sample period, the list had been revised 104 times.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Table 1 presents the information on historical revision of the short selling list on 
HKSE. Columns 1 and 5 (labelled “Change Date”) indicate the effective dates on which a 
new version of the list of designated stocks for short selling took effect. Columns 2, 6 and 10 
(labelled “Addition”) report the number of stocks that are newly added to the list during each 
revision.  These stocks will be able to be sold short from the indicated effective date onwards.  
Columns 3, 7 and 11 (labelled “Deletion”) report the number of stocks that are removed from 
the list during each revision. These stocks will no longer be allowed to be sold short from the 
effective date onwards. Columns 4, 8 and 12 (labelled “No. of on-list stocks”) report the total 
number of stocks that can be sold short after the effective date of each revision. By December 
2011, there are 1,777 additions and 1,171 deletions. A closer look at all the stocks involved 
during these revisions shows that some stocks have never appeared on the list, some had been 
added to the list but were removed from it later, and some were added to the list and have 
never been removed from it.  
The unique feature of HKSE on short selling enables us to investigate how stocks 
with different short sales constraints (i.e., stocks on the list and thus can be sold short versus 
stocks that are not on the list and thus are constrained to be sold short) react to earnings 
announcements. Following Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) prediction, we investigate two 
types of news, good and bad, and examine how short-sales constraints affect stocks’ reaction 
to the news.   
7 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
We obtain the earnings announcement dates through Thomson Reuters via SIRCA.  
Daily closing price, market capitalisation and book-to-market ratio for all Hong Kong stocks 
traded on the HKSE, including both shortable and non-shortable stocks, and Hang Seng Price 
Index are sourced from DataStream. Our sample period is from 1
st
 January 1994 to 31
st
 
December 2011. 
It is important to first classify the types of news. There are various ways in the 
literature that have been used to define the types of news (positive or negative). In this study, 
we follow Engelberg, Reed and Ringgenberg (2012) to identify positive and negative 
earnings announcements. They define a negative (positive) news event as one where a firm’s 
announcement day return is in the bottom (top) quintile of all returns on a given day, and a 
neutral news event when a firm’s announcement day return is in neither the top, nor the 
bottom quintile.  
We use the standard event study in examining the price reaction of stocks to negative 
earnings announcements. In comparison with the cross-sectional analysis adopted by most 
empirical studies on short sale constraint, where it is hard to control for many exogenous and 
endogenous factors, event study is relatively free of this problem. The abnormal return (AR) 
and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are defined as:    
   ( )            (       )    (1) 
    (     )  ∑            (       ) 
  
    
               (2) 
 
where    ( ) indicates the abnormal return of stock   at event day  , with event day 0 
defined as announcement day.      (     ) represents the cumulative abnormal return between 
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   and    in different event windows,    represent the estimated slope coefficient for the stock 
  based on the stock’s historical return series from day -31 to day -280,    and    are the 
risk free rate (the three-month Hong Kong interbank offered rate) and the Hong Kong stock 
exchange market return calculated based on Hang Seng index.  
 For each group of stocks (shortable and nonshortable), we rank all the negative 
(positive) AR0, i.e., the abnormal returns on the announcement day, and select the stocks 
whose AR0 s fall in the bottom (top) quintile as our sample. We then compute the average AR0 
of shortable and nonshortable sample and compare their difference. According to Diamond 
and Verrecchia (1987), the absolute value of average AR0 should be higher for nonshortable 
stocks than shortable stocks.  
 To gain more insights into the price reaction of different types of stocks to the 
earnings announcements, we look at the CARs of various event windows of the two types of 
stocks around the announcements. In particular, we apply regression framework proposed by 
Savor (2012) to investigate the post earnings announcement pricing of the stocks. In so doing, 
we regress the post earnings CARs of various windows on the event day abnormal return AR0, 
to see how efficiently the prices react to the information on the event day:  
                                  
                                                          (3) 
Where       is the cumulative abnormal return over a period starting from day m to day n 
after the event date, and     is the event day abnormal return. X are a number of control 
variables including log size (log(MV)), log book-market-ratio (log(BM)) and trading volume 
(VOL). We use the WLS regression to estimate the parameters, where weights are set to be 
equal cross-sectional. T-statistics are calculated using clustered standard errors. Positive 
  indicates that there is a return continuation following the announcements, suggesting that 
investors underreact to the information on the event day. While negative    means that prices 
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reverse following the announcement, suggesting that investors overreact to the information. 
Also, by varying event window (m,n), we can find out how long it will take for the prices to 
fully incorporate all the information.  
 
4. Empirical Results and Analysis 
We first compare the event day abnormal returns of nonshortable stocks with those of 
shortable stocks. The results are presented in Table 2. We report the abnormal returns of both 
types of stocks from day -10 to day 10, and for both types of earnings announcements. We 
observe that, consistent with Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), prices drop (increase) more 
significantly for nonshortable stocks than for shortable stocks on announcement of bad (good) 
news. On the day when negative earnings information is released, prices of shortable stocks 
on average drop by 5.57% (median of 4.71%), while those of nonshortable stocks drop by 
8.10% (median of 6.40%), which is 45% higher than the shortable stocks. When positive 
earnings information is released, prices of shortable stocks on average increase by 7.83% 
(with a median of 6.90%), while those of nonshortable stocks increase by 12.60% (median of 
9.56%). Second, for the bad news announcements, both types of stocks on average exhibit 
positive abnormal returns around one week before the announcement. But when we compare 
the magnitude of the positive returns, we can see that the absolute values of abnormal returns 
from nonshortable stocks are again much higher than those from shortable stocks. Such 
finding is consistent with Miller (1977) overpricing prediction that before private information 
is made public, there is a divergent opinion among investors regarding the information. When 
short sales are not allowed, only optimistic opinions are incorporated into prices, causing the 
assets to be overvalued. That is why we see higher positive returns before earnings 
announcement from nonshortable stocks than from nonshortable stocks. Similar pattern also 
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appears for the good news announcements. While shortable stocks have negative abnormal 
returns before the announcements, nonshortable stocks show significant positive abnormal 
returns during the same period of time, resulting in a more significant difference between 
shortable and nonshortable stocks.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
The second point above is further confirmed in Table 3 where we present the CARs 
with various event windows for both types of stocks, and test their differences. We can see 
that from day -10 to day -2 before the announcements of negative earnings news, shortable 
stocks increase in prices by 0.79%, while nonshortable stocks increase in prices by 2.32%, 
which is three times as high as shortable stocks. The difference is highly significant. And 
such pattern is vividly shown in Figure 1. But for CAR (-10, -2) of stocks before good 
earnings announcements, it is -0.96% for shortable stocks and 0.51% for non-shortable stocks. 
And such difference is, again, probably caused by overpricing of nonshortable stocks.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
We next turn to test the efficiency of the price reaction to the earnings announcements 
by both types of stocks. In so doing, we apply Savor (2012) model and run cross-sectional 
regression of the post-event CARs with various event windows on the event day abnormal 
return AR0.  If the regression coefficient is positive, it means that there is price continuation 
following the event, i.e., after the negative (positive) earnings announcement dates, prices 
continue to drop (rise). Hence, it suggests that investors underreact to the earnings 
announcement on the event days. However, if the regression coefficient is negative, it means 
that prices reverse after the event days, which is an evidence indicating that investors 
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overreact to the earnings announcements. Our regression results on shortable and 
nonshortable stocks are reported in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
In Table 4, we reports the regression results on shortable and nonshortable stocks with 
good and bad earnings announcements in Panels A, B, C and D, respectively. The dependent 
variables are CARs with various specification of the event windows, namely (1,1), (1,5), 
( 1,10), (1,20), (1,30), (1,40), (1,50) and (1,60). In Panel A (reaction of shortable stocks to 
negative news), B (reaction of shortable stocks to positive news), and D (reaction of 
nonshortable stocks to positive news), coefficients on AR0 under all the specifications are 
statistically indifferent from 0, suggesting when good earnings announcements are made 
public, all stocks, either shortable or nonshortable, incorporate the information into prices 
quickly and efficiently on the announcement days. And when bad earnings announcements 
are publicized, shortable stocks also react quickly and efficiently to the information.  Panel C, 
however, shows that coefficients on AR0 when dependent variables are CAR (1, 1), CAR (1, 5) 
and CAR (1, 10) are negative and statistically significant at 10% level. It means that prices of 
nonshortable stocks reverse after the bad earnings announcements, suggesting an 
overreaction of nonshortable stocks toward negative public information on the announcement 
days. The coefficients on AR0 of other specifications are insignificant, implying that the 
overreaction gets corrected within 10 days following the announcements.  
In order to investigate the speed of price adjustment of nonshortable stocks after the 
earnings announcement, we further refine our test by changing the event windows of our 
regressor CARs. As results reported in Panel C of Table 4, indicate that prices of nonshortable 
stocks reverse within about 10 days following the announcement day. We further define our 
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dependent variables as CAR (1, n) where n changes from 1 to 15 and reports our results in 
Table 5.  
We can see that while all coefficients on AR0 are negative, they become statistically 
insignificant after day 9. Before that day, all the coefficients are negative and statistically 
significant. For example, when CAR (1, 1) is regressed on AR0, the coefficient is -0.1477, 
with t-statistics of -2.62. This finding implies that following the significant drops on the event 
day, prices of nonshortable stocks reverses on the next day. And the higher the price drops on 
day 0, the higher the price rises on day 1. Such price reversal continues until day 9, though 
the statistical significance gradually declines. After day 9, the CARs are no longer related to 
AR0. Hence, it takes about 9 days for the information to be correctly and fully incorporated 
into prices of nonshortable stocks.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 This study looks at how short sales constraints impact the price adjustment to 
information. In particular, we look at how stocks with short sales constraints react differently 
to earnings announcements from stocks without short sales constraints. Our empirical tests 
show that, consistent with the prediction from a theoretical framework in Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987), nonshortable stocks react more strongly to the negative information than 
shortable stocks. We further find that nonshortable stocks are more overpriced before the 
announcements of negative earnings news. Hence, part of the strong reaction of prices of 
nonshortable stocks on announcement day is the correction for such overpricing. Next, we 
report that prices of nonshortable stocks reverse following the announcement of negative 
information, suggesting that investors may overreact to negative information on the 
announcement day. But such evidence is absent from shortable stocks, showing that stocks 
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without short sales constraints react to information quickly and accurately. Lastly, our test 
indicates that it takes about 9 days for the prices of nonshortable stocks to fully adjust to the 
negative earnings information. Such findings contribute to a better understanding of effect of 
short-sales constraints on market informational efficiencies, and will have important 
implication to regulators, practitioners and academia theorists.  
 
  
14 
 
References 
Aitken, M. J., Frino, A., McCorry, M. S., & Swan, P. L. (1998). Short sales are almost 
instantaneously bad news: Evidence from the Australian Stock Exchange. The 
Journal of Finance, 53(6), 2205-2223.  
Beber, A., & Pagano, M. (2013). Short-Selling Bans Around the World: Evidence from the 
2007-09 Crisis.The Journal of Finance, 68(1), 343-381. 
Berkman, H., Dimitrov, V., Jain, P. C., Koch, P. D., & Tice, S. (2009). Sell on the news: 
Differences of opinion, short-sales constraints, and returns around earnings 
announcements. Journal of Financial  Economics, 92(3), 376-399.  
Berkman, H., & McKenzie, M. D. (2012). Earnings announcements: Good news for 
institutional investors and short sellers. The Financial Review, 47(1), 91-113.  
Biais, B., Bisière, C., & Décamps, J.-P. (2002). Short sales constraints, liquidity and price 
discovery: An empirical analysis on the Paris Bourse. European Financial 
Management, 5(3), 395-410.  
Boehmer, E., Jones, C. M., & Zhang, X. (2008). Which shorts are informed? The Journal of 
Finance, 63(2), 491-527.  
Boehmer, E., & Wu, J. (2008). Short selling and the informational efficiency of prices. Texas 
A&M University, unpublished manuscript. 
Bris, A., Goetzmann, W. N., & Zhu, N. (2007). Efficiency and the bear: Short sales and 
markets around the world. The Journal of Finance, 62(3), 1029-1079.  
15 
 
Chang, E. C., Cheng, J. W., & Yu, Y. (2007). Short-sales constraints and price discovery: 
Evidence from the Hong Kong market. The Journal of Finance, 62(5), 2097-2121.  
Chen, C. X., & Rhee, S. G. (2010). Short sales and speed of price adjustment: Evidence from 
the Hong Kong stock market. Journal of Banking & Finance, 34, 471-483.  
Christophe, S. E., Ferri, M. G., & Angel, J. J. (2004). Short-selling prior to earnings 
announcements. The Journal of Finance, 59(4), 1845-1876.  
Daske, H., Richardson, S. A., & Tuna, İ. (2005). Do short sale transactions precede bad news 
events? Working paper, University of Pennsylvania.  
Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1987). Constraints on short-selling and asset price 
adjustment to private information. Journal of Financial Economics, 18(2), 277-311.  
Diether, K. B., Lee, K.-H., & Werne, I. M. (2009). Short-sale strategies and return 
predictability. Review of Financial Studies, 22, 575-607.  
Engelberg, J. E., Reed, A. V., & Ringgenberg, M. C. (2012). How are shorts informed? 
Journal of Financial Economics, 105(2), 260-278.  
Figlewski, S. (1981). The information effects of restrictions on short sales: Some empircial 
evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 16(4), 463-476.  
Fung, J., & Draper, P. (1999). Mispricing of index futures contracts and short sales 
constraints. Journal of Futures Market, 19, 695-715.  
Geczy, D. C., Musto, d. K., & Reed, A. V. (2002). Stocks are special too: An analysis of the 
equity lending market. Journal of Financial Economics, 66, 214-269.  
16 
 
Griffin, J. M., Shu, T., & Topaloglu, S. (2008). How informed are the smart guys? Evidence 
from short-term institutional trading prior to major events. Unpublished Working 
Paper.  
Hong, H., Kubik, J. D., & Fishman, T. (2012). Do arbitrageur samplify economic shocks? 
Journal of Financial Economics, 103(3), 454-470.  
Jones, C. M., & Lamont, O. A. (2002). Short-sale constraints and stock returns. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 66(2-3), 207-239.  
Lasser, D. J., Wang, X., & Zhang, Y. (2010). The effect of short selling on market reactions 
to earnings announcements. Contemporary Accounting Research, 27(2), 609-638.  
Li, L., & Fleisher, B. M. (2004). Heterogeneous expectations and stock prices in segmented 
markets: Application to Chinese firms. The Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Finance, 44(4), 521-538.  
Miller, E. M. (1977). Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion. The Journal of Finance, 
32, 1151-1168.  
Poitras, G. (2002). Short sales restrictions, dilution and the pricing of rights issues on the 
Singapore Stock Exchange. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 10(2), 141-162.  
Reed, A. V. (2007). Costly short selling and stock price adjustment to earnings 
announcements. Unpublished working paper.  
Zheng, L. (2009). Short sales and post earnings announcement drift. Available at SSRN.  
  
17 
 
Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Shortable Stocks and Non-Shortable Stocks 
(Bad News) 
 
This figure presents the cumulative average daily abnormal returns for shortable stocks (SS) and non-shortable stocks (NSS) 
over a 21 day period around the negative and positive earnings announcements. 
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Table 1: Changes in the Official Short-Selling List 
This table provides information on changes in the official short-selling list of the HKSE from January 1994 to December 2011, including the effective date on which a change took place (“Change date”), the number of 
stocks added to (“Addition”) and deleted from (“Deletion” ) the list, and the total number of stocks appearing on the list (“No. of on-list stocks”). 
Change Date Addition Deletion No. of on-list stocks   Change Date Addition Deletion No. of on-list stocks   Change Date Addition Deletion No. of on-list stocks 
3/01/1994 17 0 17   17/05/2005 37 9 264   3/06/2008 5 0 545 
25/03/1996 96 0 113 8/07/2005 1 0 265 7/08/2008 10 51 504 
1/05/1997 129 1 241 15/07/2005 1 0 266 14/11/2008 6 144 366 
12/01/1998 69 0 310 15/08/2005 14 12 268 12/02/2009 25 27 364 
16/03/1998 15 0 325 5/09/2005 1 0 269 14/05/2009 13 22 355 
9/11/1998 19 149 195 28/10/2005 1 0 270 10/07/2009 1 0 356 
1/03/1999 7 7 195 18/11/2005 11 7 274 5/08/2009 49 16 389 
20/09/1999 3 17 181 20/02/2006 10 8 276 5/11/2009 58 11 436 
12/11/1999 1 0 182 1/03/2006 2 0 278 18/11/2009 1 0 437 
28/02/2000 24 12 194 29/05/2006 23 17 284 3/12/2009 1 0 438 
31/05/2000 7 0 201 2/06/2006 1 0 285 15/12/2009 1 0 439 
28/08/2000 32 16 217 2/06/2006 1 0 286 24/12/2009 1 0 440 
12/02/2001 15 11 221 25/08/2006 38 10 314 1/02/2010 65 8 497 
14/05/2001 6 0 227 1/09/2006 1 0 315 1/03/2010 1 0 498 
20/08/2001 9 11 225 23/10/2006 1 0 316 10/03/2010 1 0 499 
3/12/2001 17 85 157 27/10/2006 1 0 317 25/03/2010 1 0 500 
25/02/2002 7 14 150 1/12/2006 55 9 363 10/05/2010 59 12 547 
21/05/2002 11 6 155 5/03/2007 30 24 369 16/07/2010 1 0 548 
29/07/2002 24 5 174 14/03/2007 1 0 370 4/08/2010 40 19 569 
29/11/2002 6 15 165 19/04/2007 5 0 375 30/08/2010 1 0 570 
27/01/2003 5 7 163 26/04/2007 4 0 379 29/10/2010 47 18 599 
19/05/2003 18 7 174 21/05/2007 29 14 394 15/11/2010 1 0 600 
21/07/2003 1 16 159 21/05/2007 1 0 395 22/11/2010 2 0 602 
4/08/2003 0 1 158 29/05/2007 1 0 396 20/12/2010 1 0 603 
3/11/2003 36 5 189 4/07/2007 1 0 397 30/12/2010 1 0 604 
6/01/2004 1 0 190 17/07/2007 1 0 398 28/01/2011 1 0 605 
10/02/2004 29 3 216 13/08/2007 137 9 526 1/02/2011 1 0 606 
7/04/2004 1 0 217 27/08/2007 1 0 527 25/02/2011 70 17 659 
27/04/2004 26 4 239 26/11/2007 64 23 568 24/05/2011 65 18 706 
1/07/2004 1 0 240 14/12/2007 2 0 570 9/06/2011 1 0 707 
9/07/2004 1 0 241 14/12/2007 1 0 571 12/07/2011 2 0 709 
2/08/2004 8 21 228 18/02/2008 33 41 563 12/08/2011 24 50 683 
8/11/2004 9 11 226 13/03/2008 1 0 564 6/09/2011 1 0 684 
7/02/2005 15 7 234 13/05/2008 22 47 539 3/11/2011 18 97 605 
1/03/2005 2 0 236 15/05/2008 1 0 540 14/11/2011 1 0 606 
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Table 2: Mean Abnormal Returns around Earnings Announcements for Shortable Stocks and Non-Shortable Stocks  
 
This table reports abnormal return around the earnings announcement dates for shortable and non-shortable stocks, when bad news is released. The earnings announcement date is defined as Day0. One-tailed test is 
obtained by calculating the percentage of the mean of abnormal returns from the data sample. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Negative Earnings Announcements 
 
Negative Earnings Announcements 
 
Shortable Stocks Non-Shortable Stocks 
 
Shortable Stocks Non-Shortable Stocks 
 
 (N=1,489) (N=3,264) 
 
 (N=681) (N=1,874) 
Day Mean AR Median AR t-stats Mean AR Median AR t-stats   Mean AR Median AR t-stats Mean AR Median AR t-stats 
-10 0.10% -0.08% 0.939 0.00% -0.02% -0.027 
 
0.53% -0.12% 1.222 0.37% 0.03% 2.299* 
-9 -0.14% -0.05% -1.370 -0.01% 0.04% -0.079 
 
-0.68% -0.69% -3.947*** 0.53% 0.02% 3.280*** 
-8 0.10% -0.01% 0.972 -0.03% -0.07% -0.274 
 
-0.07% -0.14% -0.422 -0.37% -0.07% -2.564** 
-7 0.06% -0.11% 0.539 0.90% 0.14% 7.330*** 
 
0.22% 0.05% 1.145 -0.25% -0.04% -1.805* 
-6 -0.27% -0.45% -2.897** 0.01% -0.01% 0.092 
 
-0.32% -0.10% -2.288* -0.45% -0.07% -2.902** 
-5 -0.08% -0.10% -0.809 0.01% -0.04% 0.072 
 
-0.43% -0.09% -2.419** 0.27% 0.03% 1.883* 
-4 0.31% 0.06% 3.190*** 0.31% 0.05% 3.134*** 
 
0.82% 0.13% 3.866*** -0.09% -0.04% -0.653 
-3 0.23% -0.02% 2.361** 0.44% 0.06% 3.779*** 
 
-0.59% -0.19% -3.019** 0.49% 0.03% 3.142*** 
-2 0.49% 0.13% 4.266*** 0.70% 0.08% 6.587*** 
 
-0.44% 0.01% -2.951** 0.00% -0.16% 0.029 
-1 0.27% 0.08% 2.518** 1.14% 0.28% 7.902*** 
 
-0.40% 0.02% -2.383** -0.82% -0.07% -4.919*** 
0 -5.57% -4.71% -50.226*** -8.10% -6.40% -78.882*** 
 
7.83% 6.90% 38.859*** 12.60% 9.56% 55.119*** 
1 -0.42% -0.46% -2.849** 0.09% 0.00% 0.674 
 
-0.21% 0.00% -0.844 -0.18% -0.30% -0.797 
2 0.20% 0.07% 1.637 0.13% 0.08% 1.193 
 
-0.13% -0.01% -0.867 -0.62% -0.13% -4.247*** 
3 0.25% 0.01% 2.475** 0.05% -0.05% 0.503 
 
-0.26% -0.12% -1.612 -0.26% -0.14% -2.022* 
4 0.14% -0.08% 1.322$ 0.03% 0.00% 0.257 
 
0.99% 0.33% 5.246*** -0.07% -0.03% -0.453 
5 0.42% -0.02% 3.964*** -0.20% -0.03% -1.948* 
 
0.19% 0.10% 1.216 0.24% -0.06% 1.645* 
6 -0.24% -0.29% -2.568** -0.27% -0.04% -2.905** 
 
0.23% -0.08% 1.372 -0.20% -0.06% -1.563 
7 -0.09% -0.10% -1.125 0.04% -0.02% 0.355 
 
0.56% 0.03% 3.922*** -0.23% -0.09% -1.733* 
8 -0.08% -0.03% -0.991 -0.07% -0.03% -0.68 
 
0.12% -0.01% 0.786 -0.26% -0.01% -1.729* 
9 0.30% 0.06% 3.366*** -0.20% 0.01% -1.849* 
 
-0.33% -0.17% -2.647** 0.23% 0.13% 1.317 
10 0.01% -0.05% 0.116 0.17% 0.06% 1.834*   -0.47% -0.34% -3.427*** 0.45% 0.05% 2.859** 
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Table 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around Earnings Announcements for Shortable Stocks and Non-Shortable Stocks  
 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the earnings announcement dates for shortable and non-shortable stocks, when bad news is released. The earnings announcement date is 
defined as Day0. One-tailed test is obtained by calculating the percentage of the mean cumulative abnormal returns and the CAR difference between the non-shortable and shortable stocks from the data 
sample. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
Negative Earnings Announcements 
 
Negative Earnings Announcements 
  
 
Shortable Stocks Non-Shortable Stocks 
   
Shortable Stocks Non-Shortable Stocks 
  
  (N=1,489) (N=3,264)        (N=681) (N=1,874)     
Event Windows Mean CAR Median CAR t-stats Mean CAR Median CAR t-stats NSS-SS P-value   Mean CAR Median CAR t-stats Mean CAR Median CAR t-stats NSS-SS P-value 
(-10, -2) 0.79% 0.10% 2.430** 2.32% 0.76% 8.014*** 1.53% 0.0005 
 
-0.96% -0.55% -1.736* 0.51% -0.49% 1.243 1.47% 0.0329 
(-1, 0) -5.30% -4.91% -33.374*** -6.95% -6.50% -41.522*** -1.65% <.0001 
 
7.43% 7.12% 29.919*** 11.78% 9.16% 40.725*** 4.35% <.0001 
(-1, 1) -5.72% -5.24% -26.178*** -6.86% -6.41% -33.383*** -1.14% <.0001 
 
7.22% 7.54% 21.737*** 11.60% 8.35% 30.557*** 4.38% <.0001 
(-2, 2) -5.03% -4.62% -17.724*** -6.04% -5.67% -24.074*** -1.01% <.0001 
 
6.66% 6.22% 16.960*** 10.98% 8.80% 25.215*** 4.32% <.0001 
(-5, 5) -3.77% -4.04% -10.242*** -5.40% -5.29% -16.156*** -1.63% <.0001 
 
7.37% 7.46% 14.377*** 11.56% 8.45% 21.393*** 4.19% <.0001 
(0,2) -5.79% -5.18% -23.594*** -7.87% -6.86% -42.427*** -2.08% <.0001 
 
7.49% 7.41% 23.432*** 11.80% 8.48% 32.596*** 4.31% <.0001 
(0,5) -4.99% -4.91% -16.937*** -8.00% -7.33% -33.456*** -3.01% <.0001 
 
8.40% 7.84% 19.036*** 11.70% 8.95% 28.681*** 3.30% <.0001 
(0,10) -5.10% -4.69% -13.601*** -8.34% -7.97% -25.689*** -3.24% <.0001 
 
8.52% 7.15% 15.491*** 11.68% 9.76% 23.751*** 3.16% <.0001 
(2, 10) 0.89% 0.19% 2.914*** -0.33% -0.69% -1.179 -1.22% <.0001  0.90% 0.49% 2.091* -0.73% -0.87% -1.751* -1.63% <.0001 
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Table 4: Determinants of Shortable and Non-Shortable Stock Returns Following Earnings Announcements  
 
Tables below report coefficient estimates of the following regression: CARm,n = α + βAR0 + γ'X + μ. CARm,n is the cumulative abnormal return over a period starting m and ending n trading days after the event day, 
and AR0 is the event day abnormal return. X includes log size (log(MV)), log book-to-market ratio (log(BM)) and trading volume (VOL). Parameter estimates are computed using the WLS approach, where weights 
are set each cross-section has equal weight. T-statistics (Italic) are calculated using clustered standard errors. 
A: Determinants of shortable stocks returns following negative earnings announcements    
Shortable & Negative Earnings Announcements  
  Intercept AR0 log(MV) log(BM) VOL R
2
 
CAR1,1 0.0243 0.0790 -0.0028 -0.0027 -0.2653 1.22% 
 
1.15 0.66 -1.41 -0.72 -1.50  
CAR1,5 0.0654 0.1720 -0.0053 0.0024 -0.7706 2.65% 
 
1.77 0.92 -1.53 0.41 -1.68  
CAR1,10 0.0614 0.1324 -0.0056 0.0056 -0.6795 1.58% 
 
1.35 0.54 -1.28 0.66 -1.67  
CAR1,20 0.1572 0.4311 -0.0150 0.0047 0.2536 2.42% 
 
1.85 1.22 -1.71 0.27 0.32  
CAR1,30 0.1728 0.5127 -0.0162 0.0110 -0.1783 2.57% 
 
1.83 1.33 -1.63 0.54 -0.22  
CAR1,40 0.1952 0.5042 -0.0169 0.0382 -0.8628 5.31% 
 
2.08 1.24 -1.78 2.01 -0.87  
CAR1,50 0.2407 0.5778 -0.0208 0.0544 -0.7761 7.89% 
 
2.29 1.45 -1.89 2.40 -0.83  
CAR1,60 0.3044 0.6752 -0.0277 0.0598 -0.2628 7.52% 
  2.32 1.52 -1.99 2.20 -0.23   
 
  
 22 
 
 
B: Determinants of shortable stocks returns following positive earnings announcements    
Shortable & Positive Earnings Announcements  
  Intercept AR0 log(MV) log(BM) VOL R
2
 
CAR1,1 -0.0010 -0.1338 0.0019 0.0002 -0.1938 2.99% 
 
-0.04 -1.47 0.82 0.03 -0.92  
CAR1,5 0.0377 -0.2181 -0.0016 -0.0027 0.0109 0.92% 
 
0.63 -0.94 -0.28 -0.22 0.47  
CAR1,10 0.0103 -0.0916 0.0016 0.0154 -0.0690 0.84% 
 
0.14 -0.30 0.23 1.08 -0.05  
CAR1,20 0.0604 -0.1415 -0.0036 0.0389 -0.0307 4.24% 
 
0.79 -0.54 -0.49 2.36 -0.03  
CAR1,30 0.0741 -0.0641 -0.0033 0.0465 -1.5451 5.07% 
 
0.65 -0.19 -0.28 1.85 -1.36  
CAR1,40 0.0601 -0.1878 0.0011 0.0845 2.0258 11.00% 
 
0.57 -0.57 0.11 3.36 -1.26  
CAR1,50 0.1526 -0.0220 -0.0103 0.1017 -2.4037 14.77% 
 
1.27 -0.05 -0.85 3.71 -1.15  
CAR1,60 0.1783 -0.0589 -0.0146 0.1110 -1.8759 15.02% 
  1.39 -0.12 -1.17 3.80 -0.97   
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C: Determinants of non shortable stocks returns following negative earnings announcements    
Nonshortable & Negative Earnings Announcements   
  Intercept AR0 log(MV) log(BM) VOL R
2
 
CAR1,1 0.0241 -0.1477 -0.0059 0.0046 -0.2004 2.90% 
 
1.46 -2.62*** -2.13 1.91 -1.82  
CAR1,5 0.0677 -0.1761 -0.0146 0.0075 -0.2466 3.10% 
 
2.55 -1.92* -3.29 1.74 -1.87  
CAR1,10 0.1060 -0.1931 -0.0228 0.0088 -0.1120 3.29% 
 
3.10 -1.65* -3.91 1.38 -0.34  
CAR1,20 0.2157 -0.1444 -0.0428 0.0266 -0.2786 6.62% 
 
4.22 -1.02 -4.81 3.16 -1.06  
CAR1,30 0.3018 -0.1990 -0.0598 0.0499 -0.3296 10.78% 
 
5.20 -1.20 -6.05 3.45 -1.12  
CAR1,40 0.3886 -0.2764 -0.0779 0.0748 -0.5322 15.30% 
 
5.89 -1.56 -7.01 4.94 -1.80  
CAR1,50 0.4531 -0.1198 -0.0863 0.0968 -0.6826 16.99% 
 
6.42 -0.58 -7.26 5.78 -2.02 
 CAR1,60 0.5686 0.0402 -0.1050 0.1158 -0.6483 18.28% 
  6.99 0.18 -7.68 5.80 -0.99   
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D: Determinants of non-shortable stocks returns following positive earnings announcements    
Nonshortable & Positive Earnings Announcements  
  Intercept AR0 log(MV) log(BM) VOL R
2
 
CAR1,1 0.0071 0.0778 -0.0039 -0.0013 0.0182 1.07% 
 
0.29 0.92 -1.12 -0.49 0.14  
CAR1,5 0.0395 -0.0155 -0.0108 -0.0021 0.1955 0.62% 
 
1.01 -0.20 -1.66 -0.32 0.64  
CAR1,10 0.0876 -0.1478 -0.0170 0.0035 0.5124 1.73% 
 
1.63 -1.54 -1.88 0.46 1.51  
CAR1,20 0.2061 -0.2770 -0.0358 0.0077 0.4239 2.90% 
 
3.02 -1.21 -3.02 0.75 0.96  
CAR1,30 0.2598 -0.2331 -0.0424 0.0148 0.2423 2.38% 
 
3.45 -1.75 -3.04 1.25 0.48  
CAR1,40 0.3535 -0.1676 -0.0591 0.0325 0.2094 4.14% 
 
4.17 -1.21 -3.76 2.51 0.38  
CAR1,50 0.4927 -0.1049 -0.0846 0.0404 0.1098 5.86% 
 
4.87 -0.65 -4.57 2.67 0.23  
CAR1,60 0.6264 -0.2067 -0.1084 0.0382 0.0534 6.92% 
  5.84 -1.23 -5.48 2.28 0.10   
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Table 5. Speed of Price Adjustment for Non-Shortable Stocks Following Negative Earnings Announcements 
This table report coefficient estimates of the following regression: CARm,n = α + βAR0 + γ'X + μ. CARm,n is the cumulative abnormal return over a period starting m and ending n trading days after the event day, and 
AR0 is the event day abnormal return. X includes log size (log(MV)), log book-to-market ratio (log(BM)) and trading volume (VOL). Parameter estimates are computed using the WLS approach, where weights are set 
each cross-section has equal weight. T-statistics (Italic) are calculated using clustered standard errors. 
    
Nonshortable & Negative Earnings Announcements 
  Intercept AR0 log(MV) log(BM) VOL 
CAR1,1 0.0241 -0.1477 -0.0059 0.0046 -0.2004 
 
1.46 -2.62*** -2.13 1.91 -1.82 
CAR1,2 0.0092 -0.1711 -0.0035 0.0041 -0.1603 
 
0.45 -2.50** -1.02 1.32 -2.01 
CAR1,3 0.0375 -0.1812 -0.0086 0.0055 -0.2676 
 
1.62 -2.56** -2.25 1.62 -2.08 
CAR1,4 0.0426 -0.181 -0.0096 0.0069 -0.4056 
 
1.66 -2.16** -2.26 1.69 -2.18 
CAR1,5 0.0677 -0.1761 -0.0146 0.0075 -0.2466 
 
2.55 -1.92* -3.29 1.74 -1.87 
CAR1,6 0.0528 -0.2633 -0.0135 0.0075 -0.3782 
 
1.75 -2.43** -2.73 1.49 -2.61 
CAR1,7 0.0693 -0.219 -0.0158 0.0074 -0.3847 
 
2.22 -1.93* -3.1 1.53 -2.45 
CAR1,8 0.0883 -0.252 -0.0201 0.008 -0.5414 
 
2.65 -2.17** -3.59 1.47 -3.11 
CAR1,9 0.0974 -0.21 -0.0213 0.008 -0.1938 
 
2.97 -1.74* -3.82 1.35 -0.53 
CAR1,10 0.106 -0.1931 -0.0228 0.0088 -0.112 
 
3.1 -1.56 -3.91 1.38 -0.34 
CAR1,11 0.1088 -0.1724 -0.023 0.0105 -0.221 
 
3.23 -1.51 -4.04 1.72 -0.74 
CAR1,12 0.1286 -0.1437 -0.0259 0.0119 -0.2966 
 
3.73 -1.22 -4.47 1.98 -1.05 
CAR1,13 0.136 -0.1009 -0.0272 0.0141 -0.2392 
 
3.7 -0.81 -4.33 2.15 -0.73 
CAR1,14 0.1861 -0.0546 -0.0357 0.0131 -0.1611 
 
4.5 -0.43 -4.91 1.76 -0.52 
CAR1,15 0.2085 -0.0339 -0.0393 0.0151 -0.1946 
  4.76 -0.27 -5.15 1.9 -0.67 
 
